RESEARCH FIELDS

• Comparative Political Economics: Fiscal Policymaking, Special Interest Groups, Coalition Formation Politics, Budget Bargaining Models, and Lobbying Models.
• American Politics: Executive-Legislative Relations, Special Interest Groups.
• Quantitative Methods: Longitudinal Panel Data, Time-Series, Hierarchical Linear Models.
• Game Theory: Bargaining Models, Lobbying Models, and Information Games.

Ph.D DISSERTATION

The Politics of Responsible Fiscal Governance: Lobbying, Bargaining, and Fiscal Policymaking in Latin America. 

My doctoral dissertation explores the question of decit-reduction policies. Over the last two decades, Latin American countries have implemented meaningful fiscal reforms introducing numerical restrictions, multi-year budgetary frameworks, and limits on national and sub-national debts. In fact, fiscal policymaking has become increasingly centralized, and the role of finance ministers has been strengthened. Many countries have also adopted scal responsibility and financial administration laws. However, the success of these reforms in reducing fiscal deficit and debt has been moderate and varies substantially across countries.

What explains these cross-country dierences in fiscal governance? This is a crucial question for the study of comparative political economy nowadays because the most recent economic crises have revealed how fiscally vulnerable governments are in both developed and developing countries. Explaining the structural causes of fiscal volatility is also essential to explain the negative effects of misleading macroeconomic management for the stability of democracy and the international cooperation. The standard answer is that scal decit is persistent in countries where fiscal institutions are poorly designed and the budget process is not perfectly centralized around the executive branch. But this argument fails to explain why policy outcomes can be so different among countries with similar institutional settings or even worse, why countries with distinct institutional settings yield similar policy outcomes.

My explanation focuses on fiscal politics rather than institutions. From my point of view, the analysis of fiscal policymaking should start with the study of two simultaneous processes. On one hand, special interest groups (businesses and local ocials) intensely lobby executive officials and legislators in order to get their preferred policies approved. On the other hand, legislatures can amend or reject executive budget proposals in a finite-horizon and institutionally constrained bargaining process. Consequently, my theory predicts that responsible fiscal policies will be enacted only if business groups have low capability to influence tax policy, and the sub-national governments cannot freely set the national budget priorities. I find that the central government will not be able to increase tax revenues if the business sector is well-organized, technically competent, or well-endowed for lobbying activities; and will be less able to cut expenditures if local and regional governments are structurally strong or highly autonomous. On the other hand, my theory of policy influence also indicates that the power of institutional (sub-national governments) and de-facto veto players (business interests) is always conditional on the preferences of the agenda-setter (the president).

I test the implications of this theory using large-N statistical analysis and in-depth qualitative analysis for three case studies in Latin America. I have collected original data data from government agencies and business associations throughout Latin America and incorporated those data in time-series, dynamic, and cross-sectional statistical models for the period 1990-2010. In addition, I conducted interviews with technocrats, legislators, subnational officers, lobby firms, and business organizations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. My field work also included frequent visits to congressional committee hearings and plenary sessions in congress at each one of these countries.

My theory of responsible fiscal governance contributes to several areas of academic interest, including the political economy of lobbying, the study of business interests, and the impact of electoral institutions on economic policymaking. Most importantly, my research emphasizes the importance of the special interest groups for fiscal governance in developing countries.

KEYWORDS: Interest Groups, Lobbying, Budget Bargaining, Economic Policymaking.

REVISE & RESUBMIT

“Collective Identity and Individual Economic Policy Preferences in Latin America.” (Revise & Resubmit: Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, And Parties)

ARTICLES UNDER REVIEW

• “Business Interests Groups and Taxation.”
• “Business Interests Groups, and Fiscal Governance: A Formal Model for Comparative Politics.”
• “Fiscal Policy and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Outcomes in Latin America after Democratization.”

 WORKING PAPERS

• “Fiscal Decentralization and Deficit Reduction Policies in Latin America.”
• “Business Interests Groups and Inequality in Latin America.”
• “Political Centralization in Pre-Colonial South American Lowlands.” (with Francisco Romano and Juan Vargas)
• “Ideology, Partisanship, and Support for Government Actions in 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic.” (with Karen Hilyard, Kevin Kim, Vicki Freimuth, and Sandra Quinn)
• “Determinants of Social Insurance Coverage in Latin America.” (with Carmelo Mesa-Lago).